An SIS epidemiology game with two subpopulations.
There is significant current interest in the application of game theory to problems in epidemiology. Most mathematical analyses of epidemiology games have studied populations where all individuals have the same risks and interests. This paper analyses the rational-expectation equilibria in an epidemiology game with two interacting subpopulations of equal size where decisions change the prevalence and transmission patterns of an infectious disease. The transmission dynamics are described by an SIS model and individuals are only allowed to invest in daily prevention measures like hygiene. The analysis shows that disassortative mixing may lead to multiple Nash equilibria when there are two interacting subpopulations affecting disease prevalence. The dynamic stability of these equilibria is analysed under the assumption that strategies change slowly in the direction of self-interest. When mixing is disassortative, interior Nash equilibria are always unstable. When mixing is positively assortative, there is a unique Nash equilibrium that is globally stable.